Filed 10/19/21 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE CRESTWOOD BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC., A158830 Plaintiff and Respondent, (City and County of San v. Francisco Super. Ct. No. CPF- DEEVERIA LACY, 19-516552) Defendant and Respondent; LILIA GARCÍA-BROWER, as Labor Commissioner, etc., Movant and Appellant. Deeveria Lacy, a former employee of respondent Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. (Crestwood), filed a retaliation complaint against Crestwood with appellant Lilia Garcia-Brower, in her official capacity as the California Labor Commissioner (Labor Commissioner or Commissioner), pursuant to Labor Code section 98.7, subdivision (a).1 After the Commissioner notified Crestwood of its investigation of Lacy’s complaint, Crestwood filed a petition to compel arbitration against Lacy but did not include the Commissioner as a 1The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), headed by the Labor Commissioner, “is the state agency empowered to enforce California’s labor laws.” (Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 561–562.) Throughout the opinion, we use the terms Labor Commissioner, Commissioner, and DLSE interchangeably. In addition, all further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated. 1 party. In granting the petition, the trial court not only compelled Lacy to arbitrate her retaliation complaint, it also stayed the Commissioner’s investigation pending the completion of that arbitration. Approximately 100 days after Crestwood alerted her to the trial court’s ruling, the Labor Commissioner moved ex parte to intervene so she could vacate the order. After requiring the Commissioner to file a noticed motion, the trial court denied her motion to intervene because it was untimely and because the order staying the Commissioner’s investigation did not impair or impede her ability to protect her interest in Lacy’s retaliation complaint. As a result, the court denied the Commissioner’s motion to vacate that order as moot. We conclude that the motion to intervene was timely and that the order staying the Commissioner’s investigation impaired her ability to vindicate the public interest. We therefore reverse. BACKGROUND Crestwood is a provider of mental health services. Lacy worked in Crestwood’s San Francisco facility as a recovery coach. When Lacy joined Crestwood, she signed and agreed to Crestwood’s “Dispute Resolution & Arbitration” policy (arbitration policy). Under that policy, “Crestwood, as well as every employee of Crestwood, agree to submit unresolved employment-related legal disputes to an impartial, objective individual called an arbitrator. . . . [¶] Arbitration is agreed to in lieu of a civil action before a judge or jury, and the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding.” (Some underlining omitted.) Crestwood terminated Lacy after she allegedly complained to a co- worker about being assaulted on the job. On January 7, 2019, Lacy filed a retaliation complaint against Crestwood with the Labor Commissioner. The Commissioner accepted the complaint and began an investigation pursuant 2 to section 98.7, subdivision (a). On January 22, 2019, the Commissioner sent a letter, notifying Crestwood of Lacy’s complaint and the Commissioner’s investigation of that complaint. After contacting Lacy and her attorney to inform them of …
Original document
